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Abstract: Recently, Khan et al. [An online-offline certificateless signature scheme
for internet of health things,” Journal of Healthcare Engineering, vol. 2020] pre-
sented a new certificateless offline/online signature scheme for Internet of Health
Things (IoHT) to fulfill the authenticity requirements of the resource-constrained
environment of (IoHT) devices. The authors claimed that the newly proposed
scheme is formally secured against Type-I adversary under the Random Oracle
Model (ROM). Unfortunately, their scheme is insecure against adaptive chosen
message attacks. It is demonstrated that an adversary can forge a valid signature
on a message by replacing the public key. Furthermore, we performed a compara-
tive analysis of the selective parameters including computation time, communica-
tion overhead, security, and formal proof by employing Evaluation based on
Distance from Average Solution (EDAS). The analysis shows that the designed
scheme of Khan et al. doesn’t have any sort of advantage over the previous
schemes. Though, the authors utilized a lightweight hyperelliptic curve cryptosys-
tem with a smaller key size of 80-bits. Finally, we give some suggestions on the
construction of a concrete security scheme under ROM.
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1 Introduction
The concept of an online/offline signature was first proposed in 1990 by Evan et al. [1]. The main idea is
to divide the signature generation algorithm into two phases (i.e., online and offline phase). The signing
algorithm performs the offline step to manage most of the heavy computations and stores without
knowing the signed message. Once the signed message arrives, the signature algorithm runs the online
step very fast and only light computations are required. Online offline signatures are more useful on some
storage limited devices such as smart cards, wireless sensors, and RFID tags, as the offline step can be
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done with a background computation during the device manufacturing process or whenever the device power
is connected. There are numerous offline/online signature schemes [2–5], designed for different applications.
In 2008, Yu and Tate [3], presents three effective online/offline signature approaches. The authors claim
that the given is formally secure in the standard model under the assumptions of RSA. Unfortunately, the
given scheme is affected by high-cost consumptions i.e., computation time and communication overhead.
Besides, Ma et al. [4], found that the first scheme of Yu and Tate [3], is not secure.
In 2010, Wu et al. [5], suggest an identity-based online/offline signature scheme under ROM using the
hardness of bilinear pairing. Unfortunately, the given scheme is affected by high-cost consumptions due to
the use of heavy pairing operation which makes it inefficient.
In 2020, Addobea et al. [6], suggest a certificateless online/offline signature scheme for mobile health
devices under ROM using the hardness of bilinear pairing. Nonetheless, the given scheme also suffers
from high-cost consumptions due to the use of heavy pairing operation that shows the inefficiency of the
designed scheme for the resource-constrained devices of mobile health.
1.1 Motivation and Contribution
To minimize the cost consumptions, Khan et al. [7], recently presented a new certificateless online/
offline signature scheme for IoHT under the hardness of hyperelliptic curve discrete logarithm problem.
The authors also claimed that the given scheme was proven secure “against adaptive chosen-message” in
the ROM. In this paper, we analyzed the formal security of Khan et al.’s scheme and proving its
insecurity against “adaptive chosen-message and identity attacks”. Furthermore, we suggest some
comments on the formal security issues of the Khan et al. [7] scheme that should be considered while
proposing a concrete security scheme. The following are some of our contributions.
 First, we proved the insecurity of Khan et al. [7] scheme against adaptive chosen message attacks.
 Then, we suggest a concrete construction of the given scheme.
 We performed a comparative analysis of the selective parameters including computation time,
communication overhead, security, and formal proof based on Evaluation based on Distance from
Average Solution (EDAS). The analysis shows that the designed scheme of Khan et al. doesn’t
have any sort of advantage over the previous schemes. For comparative analysis, we choose the
same environment (hardware and software) and the same online-offline scheme with which the
authors compared their scheme.
1.2 Organization of Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as; Section 2 presents the definition for HDLP, Section 3 reviews the
construction of the Khan et al. scheme. Section 4, shows the insecurity and Section 5 presents formal
correction. Section 6 shows the cost efficiency, while Section concludes our research work.
2 Definition 1: Hyperelliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (HDLP) Assumptions
 Let 0; ℇ {1; 2; 3; . . . n 1g and R ¼ 0: D, then finding 0 and R is known as HDLP.
3 Review of Khan et al. Scheme
Here we present the constructions of the Khan et al. [7] scheme. Additionally, the notations used in the
constructions are listed in Tab. 1.
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Setup:
 Given the security parameter g, the KGC select,
 A hyperelliptic curve (hc) with field f (n), where the size of n ≽ 280
 Devisor (D) from hc
 Hash functions Hx;Hy and Hz.
 It also picks Q ∈ f1; 2; 3; . . . . . . n 1g as a master key and computes the public key as K ¼ Q:D.
 Finally, produces a public parameter set w =fK;Hx;Hy;Hz;D; hcg n ≽ 280.
Set Secret value:
The participating entities with identity idi picks li ∈ f1; 2; 3; . . . . . . n 1g as a secret value and computes
Vi=li.D as a public key.
Set Partial private key:
For an entity with identities idi the KGC picks #i ∈ f1; 2; 3; . . . . . . n 1g, computes li ¼ #i:D,
calculatesW i ¼ #i þQHxðidi;Vi;li), and send i ¼ ðW i; liÞ to the entities with idi using a secure channel.
Set Private key:
The entities, with identity idi sets Ni ¼ ði; liÞ of its private key.
Set Public key:
The entities, with identity idi sets Zi ¼ ðVi;liÞ of its public key.
Signature Generation:
The computations of the sender are divided into two steps;
Offline Step:
Executed on the server equipped with high resources.
 It picks d ∈ f1; 2; 3; . . . . . . n 1g and computes t ¼ d :Vs
Table 1: List of notations
S/N Notation Description
1 g Security parameter
2 hc Hyperelliptic curve
3 D Divisor of hc
4 Q Master private key
5 K Master public key
6 w Global parameter set
7 ids; idr Identities of sender and receiver
8 S Signature
9 Ns;Nr Private key of sender and receiver
10 Zs;Zr Public key of sender and receiver
11 Hx;Hy; Hz. Hash functions
12 Adv Adversary
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 Compute P ¼ Hyðids;ls;m; tÞ and X ¼ Hzðids;Vs;m; tÞ
 Gives (d , t, P, X ) to the sensor nodes
Online phase:
 Compute S ¼ ls:d  ðls:X þ P:WsÞ
 Set f ¼ ðt;SÞ as a signature and send it to the receiver
Verification:
Upon reception f, the receiver can verify S as follows
 Compute P ¼ Hyðids;ls;m; tÞ and X ¼ Hzðids;Vs;m; tÞ
 checks if S:D ¼ t:XVs Pðls þ Hxðids;Vs; lsÞKÞ hold.
4 Analysis of Khan et al. Scheme
An Adv can forge the valid signature on a message (m) by replacing a public key (K).
 Subsequently after obtaining the (ids;ls), the Adv randomly choose WAdv , lAdv ∈
f1; 2; 3; . . . . . . n 1g, computes VAdv ¼ lAdvD, Hxðids;ls;VAdvÞK0 ¼ WAdvD ls);H1x and
replace the master public key (K) with K0 and idsVs with VAdv so that
WAdvD ¼ ls þ Hx ids; ls;VAdvð ÞK0 holds.
 Adv set (Adv ; lAdv) as their full private key of signer where Adv ¼ ðWAdv ; lsÞ, and sets (VAdv ; ls) as
their full public key.
 For signing a message (m), the Adv select choose d Adv ∈ f1; 2; 3; . . . . . . n 1g, compute
tAdv ¼ d AdvVAdv , PAdv ¼ Hy ids; ls;m; tAdvð Þ and XAdv ¼ Hz ids;m;VAdv ; tAdvð Þ.
Finally, Adv computes SAdv ¼ lAdvd Adv  XAdv lAdv þ PAdvWAdvð Þ and generate the signature (SAdv ; tAdv)
on the given message m.
Because tAdv ¼ d AdvVAdv ¼ d Adv lAdv PAdv ¼ Hy ids;ls;m; tAdvð Þ and XAdv ¼ Hz ids;m;VAdv ; tAdvð Þ
Thus, SAdvD ¼ tAdv  XAdvVAdv  PAdvðls þ Hx ids;VAdv ; lsð ÞK0Þ.
Therefore, we argue that the produced signature can pass through the verification successfully and the A
can generate a signature.
5 Proof and Correction
While designing a signature protocol as designed by Khan et al. [7], the public keyK needs to be hashed
to eliminate the prospect of this type of forgery. The correction with formal proof is given below.
 While executing partial private key extraction in Khan et al. [7], if the K is hashed in Hx,
the private part W i is computed as W i ¼ #i þQHxðidi;Vi; li;K), so a user can authenticate
their tuple of the partial private key (W i; liÞ, if Adv tries to forge the signature as described in
Khan et al. scheme, it then randomly pick WAdv , lAdv ∈ f1; 2; 3; . . . n 1g, computes
lAdvD;Hx idi; li;Vi;Kð Þ;K0 ¼ ðWAdvD lsÞ;H1x and replace the master public key Kwith K0 and
idsVs with VAdv .
 On verification, one can prove the equation W i ¼ #i þQHxðidi;Vi;li;K) WAdvD =
Vs+Hx ids; ls;VAdv ;K0ð Þ;K0, which cannot be held. Hence, we can claim that forgery is not possible.
986 IASC, 2021, vol.30, no.3
6 Efficiency
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our cryptanalysis in comparison with Khan et al. [7]. For
our comparative analysis, we adopt the running time of costly mathematical operations from [8] and [9].
Here, we only consider the operations that are used in the particular scheme of Khan et al. [6]. According
to [8] and [9], the cost of a single pairing-based point multiplication (PBML) is 4.31 milliseconds, the cost
of bilinear pairing (BPairing) is 14.90 milliseconds, the cost of exponentiation (EPO) is 1.25 milliseconds
and the cost of a single HCDM is approximately 0.48 milliseconds [8,9]. The total computation cost of
signing in the Khan et al. [7] scheme is 4 HCDM and the total computation cost of verification is 3 HCDM.
Note: Here we consider the same schemes with which Khan et al. [7] perform the comparative
analysis in terms of computation time and communication overhead. Tab. 2, shows cost analysis of the
selected schemes.
6.1 Computation Time
 According to Khan et al. [7] the computation time of Yu and Tate [3], is; 1EPO þ 3PBML in the signing
phase while 3EPO þ 4PBML in the Verifying phase.
 The computation time of Yu and Tate [3] scheme 2 is; 2EPO þ 3PBML in the signing phase while
3EPO þ 3PBML in the Verifying phase.
 The computation time of Wu et al. [5] scheme is; 3PBML in the signing phase while 2BPairing þ 2PBML
in the Verifying phase.
 The computation time of Addobea et al. [6] scheme is; 3PBML in the signing phase while
3BPairing þ 4PBML in the Verifying phase.
 Similarly, the computation time of Khan et al. [7] scheme is; 4 HCDM in the signing phase while
3 HCDM in the Verifying phase.
6.2 Communication Overhead
 According to Khan et al. [7], the communication overhead of Yu and Tate Scheme-I [3] is; 3 Gj j þ mj j.
 The communication overhead of Yu and Tate Scheme-II [3] scheme 2 is; 3 Gj j þ mj j.
 The communication overhead of Wu et al. [5] scheme is; 3 Gj j þ mj j.
 The communication overhead of Addobea et al. [6] scheme is; 3 Gj j þ mj j.
 Similarly, the communication overhead of Khan et al. [7] scheme is; 2 nj j þ mj j:
Table 2: Cost analysis of the selected schemes
Schemes Signing time Verifying time Total time (ms) Signature length
Yu and Tate
Scheme-I [3]
1EPO þ 3PBML 3EPO þ 4PBML 4EPO þ 7PBML ¼ 35:17 3 Gj j þ mj j ¼ 4096
Yu and Tate
Scheme-II [3]
2EPO þ 3PBML 3EPO þ 3PBML 5EPO þ 6PBML ¼ 32:11 3 Gj j þ mj j ¼ 4096
Wu et al. [5] 3PBML 2BPairing þ 2PBML 2BPairing þ 5PBML ¼ 51:41 3 Gj j þ mj j ¼ 4096
Addobea et al. [6] 3PBML 3BPairing þ 4PBML 3BPairing þ 7PBML = 74.93 3 Gj j þ mj j ¼ 4096
Khan et al. [7] 4 HCDM 3 HCDM 7 HCDM = 3.36 2 nj j þ mj j ¼ 1184
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6.3 Comparison With Our Cryptanalysis
 The total computation cost of our cryptanalysis is; 7 HCDMð Þ ¼ 7 0:48ð Þ ¼ 3:36ms
 The total computation cost of the Khan et al. [7] scheme is; 7 HCDMð Þ ¼ 7 0:48ð Þ ¼ 3:36ms
Findings
As we have seen from the aforementioned discussion, Khan et al. [7], perform an analysis of the
respective scheme based on two parameters, i.e., computation time and communication overhead.
However, these two parameters do not give us a clear advantage of Khan et al. [7], over the others.
therefore, we consider four parameters for the performance analysis such as computation time,
communication overhead, security, and formal proof respectively. Furthermore, we adopt the technique of
EDAS for the performance analysis of the chosen parameters in Section 6.4 below.
6.4 Evaluation based on Distance from Average Solution (EDAS)
In this section, we adopt the multi-criteria decision-making method also known as Evaluation based on
Distance from Average Solution (EDAS) [10–13]. The method is considered very useful when we have some
conflicting criteria [14,15]. Different performance parameters are identified in the literature are considered for
our comparative analysis including computation time, communications overhead, security, and formal proof
as shown in Tab. 3. On the other hand, for evaluation, the cross EDAS method is used to extract the cross
effective values among the selected schemes based on the chosen parameters. The assessment score (a) is
used to obtain the ranking among the selected schemes and to calculate the positive distance from
average (Pd) and negative distance from average (N d) [16,17]. The performance matrices of the selected
schemes are shown in Tab. 3.
Step-I:
Calculate the average solution (f) according to the selected criteria shown below.
fð Þ ¼ fb½ 1b (1)
Table 3: The performance matrices of the selected schemes





Security Formal proof (ROM/standard
model)
Yu and Tate Scheme-
I [3]
35.17 4096 0 1
Yu and Tate Scheme-
II [3]
32.11 4096 1 1
Wu et al. [5] 51.41 4096 1 0
Addobea et al. [6] 74.93 4096 1 0
Khan et al. [7] 3.36 1184 0 0
Average 39.396 3513.6 0.6 0.4








The aggregate calculation of the aforementioned Eqs. (1) and (2) can be obtained as an average solution
(f) as shown in Tab. 3.
Step-II:
In this particular step, the positive distance from average is calculated using the following equations
Pdav ¼ Pdavð Þab
 
bb (3)
If the bth scenario is favorable than
Pdavð Þab ¼
MAX 0; Aveb  Xabð Þð Þ
Aveb
(4)
If less favorable then
Pdavð Þab ¼
MAX 0; Xab  Avebð Þð Þ
Aveb
(5)
In the above-mentioned equations Pdav denote the positive distance from the average solution. The
results obtained are shown in Tab. 4.
Step-III
In this particular step, the negative distance from average (Ndav) is calculated using the following
equations
Ndavð Þ ¼ Ndavð Þab
 
bb (6)










0.107269774 0 0 1.5
Yu and Tate
Scheme-II [3]
0.184942634 0 0.666666667 1.5
Wu et al. [5] 0 0 0.666666667 0
Addobea et al. [6] 0 0 0.666666667 0
Khan et al. [7] 0.914712154 0.663023679 0 0
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If the bth scenario is favorable than
Ndavð Þab ¼
MAX 0; Aveb  Xabð Þð Þ
Aveb
(7)
If less favorable then
Ndavð Þab ¼
MAX 0; Xab  Avebð Þð Þ
Aveb
(8)
In the above-mentioned equations Ndavð Þab denote the positive distance from the average solution. The
results obtained are shown in Tab. 5.
Step-IV:
In this step, the weighted sum of the positive distance (Pd) is calculated using the following equation.
The results obtained are shown in Tab. 6.









0 0.16575592 1 0
Yu and Tate
Scheme-II [3]
0 0.16575592 0 0
Wu et al. [5] 0.304954818 0.16575592 0 1
Addobea et al. [6] 0.901969743 0.16575592 0 1
Khan et al. [7] 0 0 1 1











0.032180932 0 0 0.3 0.332180932
Yu and Tate
Scheme-II [3]
0.05548279 0 0.133333333 0.3 0.488816123
Wu et al. [5] 0 0 0.133333333 0 0.133333333
Addobea et al.
[6]
0 0 0.133333333 0 0.133333333
Khan et al. [7] 0.274413646 0.198907104 0 0 0.47332075




b Pdð Þab (9)
Step-V:
In this step, the weighted sum of the negative distance (Pd) is calculated using the following equation.





b¼1 b N dð Þab (10)
Step-VI:
In this step, the calculated scores obtained from WSPdð Þa& WSN d
 
a are normalized as follows,








MAXa WSN dð Það Þ
(12)
Step-VII:









Where 0  wa 	 1.
The result of wa is determined using aggregate score values of the NWSPd& NWSN d .
Step-VII:
In this step, we calculate a sequence of activities to our measurement of evaluation scores (ψ) and
determines the ranking of the selected schemes. The results suggest that the best ranking solution has a













0 0.049726776 0.2 0 0.249726776
Yu and Tate
Scheme-II [3]
0 0.049726776 0 0 0.049726776
Wu et al. [5] 0.091486445 0.049726776 0 0.2 0.341213221
Addobea et al.
[6]
0.270590923 0.049726776 0 0.2 0.520317699
Khan et al. [7] 0 0 0.2 0.2 0.4
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higher ψ compared to the other. Therefore, in the following Tab. 8, the scheme of Yu and Tate [3] Scheme
2 has the highest evaluation scores (ψ). So, the last calculated rank result is shown in Tab. 8.
6.5 Lesson Learned
From the aforementioned evaluation, we conclude that the designed scheme of Khan et al. [7] is efficient
in terms of computation time and communication overhead. However, the given is insecure against adaptive
chosen message attacks. Further, the proposed scheme of Khan et al. [7] is claimed to be secure under ROM.
On the other hand, the given scheme of Yu and Tate [3] Scheme 2 is formally secured under the standard
model. Though the given scheme has some limitations in terms of cost efficiencies but secure and proved
in the standard model.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
Recently, Khan et al. presented a new certificateless online/offline signature scheme for the Internet of
Health Things (IoHT) to fulfill the authenticity requirement for the resource-constrained environment of
(IoHT) devices. The authors claim that the newly proposed scheme is secure against Type-I adversary
under the Random Oracle Model (ROM). Unfortunately, their scheme is insecure against adaptive chosen
message attacks. It is demonstrated that an adversary can forge a valid signature on a message by
replacing the public key. Furthermore, we performed a comparative analysis of the selective parameters
including computation time, communication overhead, security, and formal proof by employing
Evaluation based on Distance from Average Solution (EDAS). The analysis shows that the designed
scheme of Khan et al. doesn’t have any sort of advantage over the previous schemes. Though, the authors
utilized a lightweight hyperelliptic curve cryptosystem with a smaller key size of 80-bits. Finally, we give
some suggestions on the construction of a concrete security scheme under ROM. Soon, we intend to
improve the security of Khan et al. under the standard model.
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Table 8: Ranking based on performance
Schemes WSPdð Þa WSN d
 





0.332180932 0.249726776 0.679562143 0.52004943 0.599805787 2
Yu and Tate
Scheme-II [3]
0.488816123 0.049726776 1.000000001 0.904429974 0.952214988 1
Wu et al. [5] 0.133333333 0.341213221 0.272767871 0.344221383 0.308494627 4
Addobea et al. [6] 0.133333333 0.520317699 0.272767871 2.06368E-10 0.136383936 5
Khan et al. [7] 0.47332075 0.4 0.9683002 0.231238913 0.599769557 3
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